The speeches, from a podium in front of 23 flags, placed in French alphabetical series, were strictly limited to six minutes each. Alija Izetbegovic, the president of Bosnia, said: “My government signs this agreement without any enthusiasm, as someone who takes a bitter but useful potion.” The Bosnian peace plan has been severely beaten, but it would end four bloody years that have killed more than 250,000 people and driven more than two million people. The final agreement was a tribute to the skills of Holbrooke and his negotiating team; To the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Christopher, who played a key role in keeping Bosnians on board and concluding the agreement at critical points; Anthony Lake, who helped sell the peace initiative to the parties involved and who insisted with Holbrooke that the talks conclude in the United States; To the Deputy National Security Adviser, Mr. Samuel Berger, who chaired the meetings of the Committee of Deputies, who informed citizens of national security operations in other nations of what was happening without much interference; and UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, who has been effectively committed to the strong U.S. position within the World Federation. In late August 1995, following an attack by Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo, NATO carried out airstrikes against Serb positions. On 1 September, Holbrooke announced that all parties would meet in Geneva to discuss. When the Bosnian Serbs did not meet all NATO conditions, NATO airstrikes resumed. On 14 September, Holbrooke successfully concluded an agreement signed by Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadsai and Ratko Mladis to end the siege of Sarajevo and oversee final peace talks to begin in Dayton, Ohio. In order to ensure sustainable regional stability, the DPA demanded specific security measures from the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These include “new forms of transparency and the highest values, in line with the respective security of the contracting parties and the need to avoid an arms race in the region.”  Stability should be achieved through various confidence and security measures and sub-regional arms control measures, which would ultimately reach the level of a regional arms control agreement. Unlike Schedule 1-A and the rest of the DPA, compliance with Schedule 1 B was voluntary and the parties were able to withdraw at any time after December 1999.
On October 13, 1997, the Croatian right-wing party in 1861 and the right-wing Party Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1861 asked the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina to overturn several decisions and uphold a decision of the Supreme Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, more importantly, to verify the constitutionality of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, given that it was claimed , the agreement violates the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a way that undermines the integrity of the state and could lead to the dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.